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Summary 
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) establishes most private-sector workers’ rights to 
unionize and collectively bargain over wages, benefits, and working conditions. Enacted in 1935, 
the NLRA also permits collective bargaining contracts between employers and labor 
organizations that require every individual covered by the collective bargaining contract to pay 
dues to the negotiating labor organization. These contract provisions are known as union security 
agreements. Since the NLRA was amended by the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, individual states 
have been permitted to supersede the union security provisions of the NLRA by enacting laws 
that prohibit union security agreements. These state laws are known as right to work (RTW) laws. 
Currently, 23 states have RTW laws. Of these, 12 states passed RTW laws prior to 1950 and 
another six passed them prior to 1960. The two most recent states to adopt RTW laws are 
Oklahoma (2001) and Indiana (2012). Several other state legislatures are debating RTW laws. 
Recent legislative proposals, with substantial numbers of cosponsors, would expand RTW 
policies nationwide. Advocates of national RTW laws claim that they would enhance personal 
freedom and employer flexibility. Opponents argue that such laws would weaken workers’ 
abilities to collectively bargain for more favorable compensation and working conditions. 
Proposals aiming to expand RTW policies typically strike the provisions of the NLRA that permit 
union security agreements. 
National RTW proposals are often discussed in the context of the economic performance of states 
that have adopted them. However, research that compares outcomes in RTW and union security 
states is inconclusive. The recent data trends between RTW and union security states are 
relatively distinct, but the influence of RTW laws in these trends (if any) is unclear. 
• Unionization rates in RTW states are less than half of what they are in union 
security states. It is ambiguous what portion of this difference is attributable to 
RTW laws and what portion is due to diverse preferences among the states 
regarding unionization. 
• In the past decade, aggregate employment in RTW states has increased modestly 
while employment in union security states has declined. It is unclear if this 
growth is attributable to RTW, other pro-business policies (which tend to be 
concentrated in RTW states), or other factors. 
• Wages are lower in RTW states than union security states. Historical research has 
suggested that RTW laws have little influence on these differences. More 
contemporary scholarship has come to diverse conclusions, depending on the 
researchers’ methodology. 
Difficulties associated with rigorously studying the relationships between RTW laws and various 
outcomes are likely to continue to make it difficult to generate definitive findings about these 
relationships. As such, the ongoing debate on RTW may be driven by factors other than rigorous 
empirical evidence. 
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Background 
To promote commerce and deter labor unrest, Congress has established laws regulating 
unionization and collective bargaining (i.e., similar workers negotiating compensation and 
working conditions as a unit rather than individually). The primary federal legislation that 
regulates private sector collective bargaining is the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 
enacted in 1935. In addition to establishing workers’ rights to organize and establishing union 
election procedures, the NLRA also permits collective bargaining contracts between employers 
and labor organizations that require all workers covered by the contract to pay dues to the 
negotiating organization. These contract provisions are known as union security agreements.1 
Since the NLRA was amended by the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, individual states have had the 
option of enacting laws that prohibit union security agreements. These state laws supersede the 
union security provisions of the NLRA and are known as right to work (RTW) laws. As of this 
writing, 23 states have enacted RTW laws. 
Since the Taft-Hartley Act, changes to federal law relating to unionization and RTW have been 
limited. Debate on this topic, however, has been ongoing and there have been legislative 
proposals to both expand and prohibit RTW laws. Supporters of expanding RTW laws claim that 
they will increase personal freedom and employer flexibility. Conversely, supporters of proposals 
to eliminate RTW laws emphasize that unions must negotiate on behalf of all workers in the unit, 
and as such, it is appropriate that all workers pay for that for representation. 
This report is divided into two parts. The first part discusses RTW laws themselves. It provides a 
brief legislative history on the federal role in the regulation of unions, a summary of the origin 
and development of RTW laws, a discussion of recent events at the state level, and federal 
legislation related to RTW. The second part of the report reviews the varied empirical research on 
the effects of RTW laws. Specifically, it will discuss the mixed evidence indicating relationships 
between RTW laws and other economic outcomes. 
Legislative History 
Prior to the passage of the federal labor laws discussed in this report, the regulation of labor and 
collective bargaining was left to the states. Laws varied, but most states adopted policies of open 
competition with minimal governmental regulations.2 
In 1926, the Railway Labor Act was the first federal law to guarantee collective bargaining rights 
to a group of workers. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, passed in 1932, prohibited federal courts from 
issuing an injunction in any labor dispute. Previously, judges could end a strike if they did not 
approve of its methods or objectives. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, however, did not guarantee 
                                                 
1 See 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(3). Specifically, the NLRA states that contracts with union security agreements may require all 
covered workers to be members of the negotiating labor organization within 30 days of beginning employment. The 
courts have interpreted union membership to be equivalent to paying union dues. This distinction is outlined in greater 
detail in the “Union Security Agreements and Required Union Dues” section of this report. 
2 Bruce Feldracker, Labor Guide to Labor Law, 4th ed. (2000), pp. 1-3. 
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collective bargaining rights; it merely regulated employer-union relations once they were 
established. 
National Labor Relations Act3 
Enacted in 1935, the NLRA governs labor-management relations and collective bargaining for 
most private sector workers.4 The NLRA is also known as the Wagner Act. Many provisions of 
the NLRA were contained in the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which was enacted in 
1933 but found unconstitutional in 1935. The Supreme Court upheld the NLRA in 1937. 
The NLRA found that the refusals of employers to collectively bargain with employees “lead to 
strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary effect 
of burdening or obstructing commerce[.]”5 To remedy this issue, the NLRA guarantees workers 
the right to organize and bargain collectively over wages, hours, and conditions of employment. It 
also establishes procedures for the election and certification of unions and establishes certain 
unfair labor practices for employers that may discourage workers from unionizing. The NLRA is 
enforced by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), an independent federal agency. 
The NLRA also permits collective bargaining contracts to contain union security agreements that 
require all workers covered under the contract to pay dues to the negotiating labor organization. 
Taft-Hartley Act 
Passed over a presidential veto in 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act (also known as the Labor 
Management Relations Act) substantially amended the NLRA. Many of the provisions in the 
Taft-Hartley Act, including the statement of purpose at the beginning, remain in current law. 
Whereas the original Wagner Act focused on asserting the rights of workers and organized labor, 
the Taft-Hartley Act addresses employers, employees, and labor unions as equal parties in the 
negotiation process and states that “neither party has any right in its relations with any other to 
engage in acts or practices which jeopardize the public health, safety, or interest.” It 
supplemented existing unfair labor practices for employers by establishing unfair labor practices 
for unions. It also prohibited secondary strikes and outlawed so-called “closed shops” that 
required an employee to be a union member prior to being hired. 
The Taft-Hartley amendments also established the RTW provisions that are still part of the 
NLRA. These provisions stated that individual states may pass laws prohibiting union security 
agreements in labor contracts and that these state laws would supersede the NLRA provisions 
authorizing union security agreements.6 
                                                 
3 For a detailed discussion of the NLRA and related laws, see CRS Report R42526, Federal Labor Relations Statutes: 
An Overview. 
4 The NLRA, as amended, is at 29 U.S.C. 141-197. It does not cover private sector workers employed by railroads or 
airlines; these workers are covered by the aforementioned Railway Labor Act. 
5 See P.L. 74-198, Section 1. 
6 See 29 U.S.C. 164(b). The RTW provisions of the NLRA are also sometimes referred to as 14(b) provisions, after the 
section of the NLRA that permits RTW laws. 
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Legislation Since Taft-Hartley 
Amendments to the NLRA since 1947 have been limited. In 1959, the Landrum-Griffin Act 
increased regulation of internal union activities and enumerated certain rights to all union 
members.7 Subsequent legislation in 1974 expanded the provisions of the NLRA to employees of 
private nonprofit hospitals, a population that had been excluded from coverage since the 
enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act. 
In 1980, the NLRA was amended to permit individuals who were covered by a union security 
agreement but were members of a religion that objected to financially supporting a labor union to 
pay the equivalent of the union dues to a charitable organization.8 No major federal legislation 
related to the NLRA or RTW has been enacted since 1980, though there has been ongoing debate 
on the issue. 
Union Security Agreements and Required 
Union Dues 
In states without RTW laws, an elected union and an employer can agree to a collective 
bargaining contract that requires all workers covered by the contract to become members within 
30 days.9 Workplaces covered by such an agreement are often called union shops. 
In 1963, the Supreme Court ruled that, even in a union shop, an employee cannot be required to 
join a union pursuant to a union security agreement. Instead, the employee may pay dues but 
decline to become a full union member.10 Dues-paying nonmembers are referred to as financial 
core members. In spite of their name, financial core members are not union members: they may 
not participate in union activities or even vote on the ratification of the collective bargaining 
contract that covers them. Financial core members are not subject to union bylaws or union 
discipline but they are subject to the rights and responsibilities in the collective bargaining 
contract with their employer. 
Subsequent decisions have concluded that financial core members only need to pay dues to cover 
the cost of collective bargaining functions. These functions include bargaining, contract 
administration, and grievance adjustment. Financial core members do not have to financially 
support union functions that are unrelated to collective bargaining such as political activities. 
Workers subject to a union security agreement must be informed of the financial core 
membership option.11 
An alternative to the union shop is the agency shop. In an agency shop, workers covered by a 
collective bargaining contract are required to pay a fee for representation (an agency fee) but are 
not required to join the union. Since union shop agreements must permit covered workers to 
                                                 
7 See P.L. 86-257. 
8 See P.L. 96-593. 
9 Covered workers in the construction industry can be required to become union members within seven days, see 29 
U.S.C. 158(f). 
10 See NLRB v. General Motors Corporation, 373 U.S. 734 (1963). 
11 Bruce Feldacker, Labor Guide to Labor Law, Fourth ed. (2000), pp. 424-438. 
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forego union membership and only pay a representation fee, union shops and agency shops 
operate similarly in practice. 
In cases where a union security agreement conflicts with a worker’s religious beliefs, the 
objecting worker may donate the equivalent of the agency fee or financial core dues to a non-
labor, non-religious charity.12 
Union Security and Workers Not Covered by the NLRA 
The collective bargaining rights of several groups of workers are covered by legislation other than 
the NLRA. Union security agreements among these groups are governed by other federal laws:  
• Interstate railway and airline employees’ collective bargaining rights are defined 
by the Railway Labor Act (RLA).13 The RLA permits union security agreements 
in all states, effectively superseding any local RTW laws.14  
• Postal workers’ collective bargaining rights are defined by the Postal 
Reorganization Act of 1970. The act specifies that dues will be deducted from an 
employee’s pay only with the written authorization of that employee.15 This 
optional deduction applies in all states. 
• Federal employees’ collective bargaining rights are defined in the Federal Service 
Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS).16 It specifies that dues will 
only be deducted from an employee’s pay upon written authorization from that 
employee.17 The FSLMRS applies equally in both RTW and union security 
states. 
State Right to Work Laws 
The Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA permit individual states to pass laws that prohibit 
union security agreements. Table 1 lists the 23 states that have passed such laws. A state may 
pursue RTW through legislation, a ballot initiative, or an amendment to its state constitution. 
                                                 
12 See 29 U.S.C. 169. 
13 The RLA also applies to any company that is defined as a “carrier” by 45 USC 151, first paragraph. It also includes 
any company that is controlled by a railroad or airline. 
14 See 45 U.S.C. 152, paragraph eleventh. 
15 See 39 U.S.C. 1205. 
16 The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is excluded from FSLMRS coverage, but the General Accounting 
Office Personnel Act of 1980 gave GAO employees the right to organize and bargain collectively. 
17 See 5 U.S.C. 7115. 
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Table 1. Right to Work States and Date of Enactment 
State Year of Enactment State Year of Enactment 
Florida 1943a Nevada 1951 
Arizona 1947 Alabama 1953 
Arkansas 1947 Mississippi 1954 
Georgia 1947 South Carolina 1954 
Iowa 1947 Utah 1955 
Nebraska 1947 Kansas 1958 
North Carolina 1947 Wyoming 1963 
North Dakota 1947 Louisiana 1976 
South Dakota 1947 Idaho 1985 
Tennessee 1947 Oklahoma 2001 
Texas 1947b Indiana 2012 
Virginia 1947   
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/righttowork.htm. 
Note: Sources vary on date of enactment. The table reflects the source cited above as well as the recent 
enactment of RTW in Indiana. 
a. While it was originally enacted in 1943, the validity of Florida’s RTW law was unclear until the enactment of 
the Taft-Hartley Act. 
b. Texas originally passed RTW in 1947, though the law was modified to its current form in 1993. 
The details of RTW laws vary by state. The law passed by Indiana in February 2012, for example, 
excluded employees of the state, employees of “a political subdivision,” and several other groups 
that are not covered by the NLRA.18 Conversely, the constitutional amendment passed in 
Oklahoma is broader and includes all workers in the state. 
The breadth of some state laws that have attempted to regulate workers who are not covered by 
the NLRA has been challenged in the courts. For example, both a federal appeals court and the 
Oklahoma supreme court have determined that Oklahoma’s prohibition of union security 
agreements does not extend to workers covered by the Railway Labor Act.19 
Recent Developments 
Federal Legislation 
While changes to federal law regarding unions and RTW have been limited in recent decades, 
debate has been robust and ongoing. Congress has considered a number of proposals that would 
amend the NLRA’s provisions regarding union security agreements. These proposals have ranged 
from striking the provisions that permit union security agreements (effectively making every state 
                                                 
18 See Section 1 of Indiana Code 22-6-6. 
19 See Local 514 Transport Workers Union v. Keating, Oklahoma supreme court (2003) and 10th Circuit Court (2004). 
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an RTW state) to striking the provisions that allow individuals states to prohibit union security 
agreements (effectively invalidating existing RTW laws).  
Since the 104th Congress, a National Right to Work bill has been introduced in the House during 
the first session of each Congress. Similar bills have regularly been introduced in the Senate 
during this time. These bills would amend the NLRA by striking the language that permits union 
security agreements and would make similar changes to the Railway Labor Act. Most national 
RTW proposals are relatively narrow in scope and only prohibit union security agreements. They 
typically do not address union election procedures or any other issues associated with collective 
bargaining. These National Right to Work proposals often have a substantial number of 
cosponsors.20 
Contrasting proposals that would strike the provisions of the NLRA that allow states to enact 
RTW laws have also been introduced in recent Congresses. These proposals have been introduced 
with much less regularity than National Right to Work proposals. These proposals typically forbid 
state RTW laws by striking the provisions of the NLRA that permit such laws.21 
State Activities 
As noted previously, Indiana is the most recent state to enact an RTW law. Since Indiana’s 
enactment of its RTW law, several state legislatures, including those in Ohio, Michigan, and New 
Hampshire have debated RTW laws, but none have enacted one. 
Empirical Evidence Relating to RTW 
There has been a great deal of debate and research on the effects of RTW laws on states that adopt 
them. Most empirical research has concluded that RTW laws have a negative relationship with 
unionization rates (also known as union density) though the causal effect is debated. The effects 
of RTW laws on other economic outcomes, such as job growth and wages, have been studied, 
though findings have been mixed and there is no broad consensus on the magnitude (if any) of the 
effects of these laws.  
Limitations on Measuring the Effects of RTW Laws 
It is important to recognize that there is no straightforward way to measure how RTW laws affect 
other outcomes. It is possible to compare data from states with RTW laws to states without such 
laws, but since it is not possible to observe the counterfactual—what would have happened in 
each state if it had a differing union security policy—there is no simple way to tell what 
contribution an RTW law (or lack thereof) made to other outcomes in the state. For example, a 
researcher could compare employment growth in Arizona (an RTW state) and neighboring New 
Mexico (a union security state), but it would be impossible to identify what portion of the 
differences between the states was attributable to their respective union security laws and what 
                                                 
20 For example, in the 112th Congress, H.R. 2040 had 77 cosponsors and S. 2173 had 19 cosponsors. 
21 For example, see H.R. 2775 in the 112th Congress. 
Right to Work Laws: Legislative Background and Empirical Research 
 
Congressional Research Service 7 
portions were attributable to differences in labor force characteristics, industry makeup, local 
taxation policies, and countless other state-specific characteristics. 
While it is not possible to completely isolate the effect of RTW laws in dynamic and complex 
economies, some researchers have attempted to estimate the effect of RTW laws by controlling 
for other factors. Their techniques have varied and it comes as little surprise that diverse 
methodologies have yielded diverse conclusions. 
The subsequent review of RTW-related studies does not attempt to be exhaustive. It does, 
however, attempt to cover frequently cited studies as well as more recent studies that attempt to 
isolate the effect of RTW laws on various outcomes. 
Right to Work and Unionization 
Table 2 shows the rate of union membership and the share of workers represented by a union in 
RTW and union security states. Two intuitive trends emerge. First, the union membership rate in 
union security states is nearly three times that of RTW states (15.8% vs. 5.7%). Second, the 
proportion of workers who are covered by a union contract but who are not members of the union 
is higher in RTW states than union security states. In RTW states, about 18% of the workers who 
are covered by a union contract are non-members (approximately 616,000 of 3.4 million). In 
union security states, this share is about 7% (about 910,000 of 12.8 million). 
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Table 2. Union Membership and Representation by Sector and in Right to Work and 
Union Security States, 2011 
 
Employment 
(in thousands) 
Union 
Members  
(in thousands) 
% Union 
Members 
Covered by 
Union 
Contract 
(in thousands) 
% Covered 
by Union 
Contract 
Total  125,210   14,755 11.8%  16,281  13.0% 
RTW   49,604     2,812 5.7%    3,428  6.9% 
Union Security   75,606   11,943 15.8%  12,853  17.0% 
      
Private Sector      
Total 104,778   7,204 6.9%  7,972  7.6% 
RTW    41,182   1,350 3.3%  1,602  3.9% 
Union Security    63,596   5,855 9.2%  6,370  10.0% 
      
Public Sector      
Total  20,432   7,550 37.0%  8,309  40.7% 
RTW    8,421   1,462 17.4%  1,827  21.7% 
Union Security  12,010   6,088 50.7%  6,482  54.0% 
Source: Current Population Survey. State-level data were disaggregated by sector by Barry Hirsch and David 
Macpherson and posted at http://www.unionstats.com/. In this presentation, CRS has divided the data into RTW 
and union security states. 
Note: Data are limited to wage and salary workers. Due to rounding, the sum of subgroups may not equal the 
corresponding larger groups. Due to varied data sources, employment levels may not be comparable to other 
tables. In accordance with its status in 2011, Indiana was classified as a union security state. 
Researchers have posited many hypotheses to explain the divergent unionization rates between 
RTW and union security states and three common hypotheses are discussed below. These 
hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and can exert a collective effect on local unionization 
levels.22 
The tastes hypothesis suggests that RTW laws reflect a state’s preexisting opposition to unions 
and that the diversity in RTW laws simply reflects diversity in preferences toward unions. Under 
this hypothesis, RTW laws have no independent effect on labor organizing: RTW states have 
lower rates of unionization because that is the preference of workers in those states. 
Examination of state-level unionization data shows support for the hypothesis that there was 
below-average union density in states before they passed RTW laws. Among the four states to 
pass RTW laws in the past 40 years, all of them had unionization rates below the national average 
prior to passage. Indiana was close to the national average (11.3% statewide vs. 11.8% nationally 
in 2011) but the three remaining states—Oklahoma (6.9% vs. 13.0% in 2000), Idaho (12.2% vs. 
18.2% in 1985), and Louisiana (16.9% vs. 24.6% in 1975)—were substantially lower. The case of 
                                                 
22 For one discussion with empirical examples, see William J. Moore, “The Determinants and Effects of Right-to-Work 
Laws: A Review of the Recent Literature,” Journal of Labor Economics, Summer 1998, pp. 449-50. 
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Idaho is particularly unique, as the unionization rate in that state fell from 23.1% in 1981 to 
12.2% in 1985. In this case, a drop in unionization preceded the passage of an RTW law, a 
sequence that is consistent with the tastes hypothesis but not with either of the other hypotheses 
discussed below. 
The free-rider hypothesis suggests that by making dues payment optional, RTW laws lead to 
workers covered by a collective bargaining contract declining to pay dues. This leads to a 
decreased number of dues-paying members having to pay more for representation. The higher 
dues may exceed remaining members’ willingness to pay for representation and more workers 
may stop paying dues, eventually leading to unsustainably high dues for the remaining members. 
Alternately, remaining workers may decline to pay higher dues, but this may restrict the 
representation services available to them. 
As noted above, the share of covered nonpaying workers relative to total workers covered by a 
union contract is higher in RTW states than union security states. A 1995 study by Sobel divided 
covered nonpaying workers into “true free riders” (those who valued union representation and 
would join the union if dues were compulsory) and “induced free riders” (those who did not value 
representation and would seek other employment if dues were compulsory). The study estimated 
that, in RTW states, about 70% of free riders were induced free riders. This means that only 30% 
of covered nonmembers in RTW states were free riding in the traditional sense.23 
The bargaining power hypothesis is related to the free rider hypothesis and suggests that RTW 
laws reduce the bargaining power of unions and lead to reduced membership in the long run. 
Under this hypothesis, unions have less incentive to organize since they know only a portion of 
the workers covered by the collective bargaining contract will pay dues. This reduces 
organization and, in the long run, the prevalence of union jobs. 
Empirical support for this hypothesis comes from a 1987 study by Ellwood and Fine, which 
looked at changes in new union organizing efforts after the passage of RTW laws. The study 
found that in the five years after states passed an RTW law, union organization fell 28% and 
union organizing success fell 46%. The same study found that these effects faded in subsequent 
years but that they may lead to a permanent decline in unionization levels.24 
The evidence from each of these intersecting hypotheses underscores the complexity of isolating 
the effect of RTW laws’ actual effect on unionization. 
Long-Term Trends in Unionization 
While there is debate as to the magnitude of influence RTW laws exert on unionization levels, 
there is little debate that there has been a long-term decline in unionization that is independent of 
RTW policies. As Table 3 shows, union density has declined in both RTW and union security 
states since 1983. The share of workers covered by a collective bargaining contract (i.e., union 
members plus covered workers who are not members) has followed a similar trend. 
                                                 
23 Russel Sobel, “Empirical Evidence on the Union Free Rider Problem: Do Right-to-Work Laws Matter?,” Journal of 
Labor Research, Summer 1995, pp. 347-365. 
24 David Ellwood and Glenn Fine, “The Impact of Right to Work Laws on Union Organizing,” Journal of Political 
Economy, April 1987, pp. 250-273. 
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Table 3. Union Membership Rates in Right to Work and Union Security States, 
1983-2011 
 1983 1991 2001 2011 
Total 20.1% 16.1% 13.5% 11.8% 
RTW  11.6%a 8.5%b 6.8%c 5.7%  
Union Security 24.3% 20.2% 17.5% 15.8% 
Source: Current Population Survey. State-level data were developed by Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson 
and posted at http://www.unionstats.com/. In this presentation, CRS has divided the data into RTW and union 
security states. 
Note: 1983 is the first year for which state-level data are available. Data are limited to wage and salary workers. 
a.  Includes the 20 states that had passed RTW laws by 1983. 
b.  Includes the 20 states that had passed RTW laws by 1983 and Idaho. 
c.  Includes the 20 states that had passed RTW laws by 1983, Idaho, and Oklahoma. 
This nationwide decline in union density further complicates analysis of RTW laws. For example, 
an RTW state’s decline in unionization could be attributable to the RTW law, other state-level 
factors, or it could be influenced by a broader decline in unionization across the country.  
Right to Work and Economic Outcomes 
Given the complexity of establishing the relationship between RTW and first-order outcomes like 
unionization rates, it comes as little surprise that the literature related to the laws’ effects on 
higher-order outcomes such as employment and wages is inconclusive. Studies have yielded a 
variety of conclusions, largely dependent on how researchers conduct their analyses. 
The remainder of this report will summarize existing (and frequently conflicting) data and 
scholarship related to RTW laws. It will discuss broad statistical trends, as well as several of the 
more sophisticated studies available that attempt to control for other factors and isolate the effect 
of RTW laws. 
Right to Work and Employment 
Broadly speaking, there are two competing views regarding the relationship between RTW laws 
and employment growth: 
• One view is that RTW laws create a favorable business environment in which 
employers have increased flexibility in hiring, discharge, and wage-setting. 
Businesses are attracted to this environment and employment in these areas 
increases. 
• The competing view is that business location decisions are driven by issues such 
as the local labor supply and investment incentives (e.g., subsidies or tax 
abatements). Under this view, RTW laws are a relatively insignificant factor in 
the location of a business. 
Table 4 presents data on employment levels for RTW and union security states between 2001 and 
2011. Aggregate employment growth was clearly greater in states with RTW laws and RTW 
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advocates often cite these trends as evidence that RTW leads to increased job growth and 
employment levels.25 
Table 4. Employment Levels for Right to Work and Union Security States, 2001, 
2006, and 2011 
 Employment (in thousands) Change in Employment 
 2001 2006 2011 2001-2006  2006-2011 2001-2011 
Total 131,590 135,836 131,336 3.2% -3.3% -0.2% 
RTW States 49,797 52,918 51,574 6.3% -2.5% 3.6% 
Union Security States 81,793 82,918 79,762 1.4% -3.8% -2.5% 
Source: Annual averages from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Employment Statistics, generated at 
http://www.bls.gov/sae/#data. In this presentation, CRS has divided the data into RTW and union security states. 
Notes: Due to varied data sources, employment levels may not be directly comparable to other tables. Total 
employment was determined by calculating the sum of states. In accordance with its status through 2011, Indiana 
was classified as a union security state. 
Opponents of RTW laws, however, argue that aggregate data are misleading and mask substantial 
variation among both RTW and union security states. For example, during the 2001-2011 period 
illustrated in Table 4, employment grew 13.7% and 8.9%, respectively, in the union security 
states of Alaska and Montana while declining 3.5% and 2.2%, respectively, in the RTW states of 
Mississippi and Alabama. Skeptics of RTW laws’ effect on employment suggest that these diverse 
outcomes show that RTW laws themselves do not lead to above-average employment growth.26 
Skeptics of the relationship between RTW laws and increased employment also note that RTW 
laws often exist alongside other, perhaps more compelling, pro-business policies. For example, 
North Dakota reported the nation’s fastest employment growth between 2001 and 2011. While it 
is an RTW state, North Dakota also sponsors a multitude of other business-oriented policies such 
as tax exemptions, subsidized training, and other financial incentives.27 North Dakota’s growth 
may also have been attributable to non-policy characteristics such as an above-average presence 
of natural resources. 
The difficulty in establishing the role of RTW in a state’s economic performance can be seen in a 
frequently cited 1998 study by Holmes that analyzed manufacturing employment in counties 
along several state borders in which one state was an RTW state (termed “probusiness” in the 
study) and the other was a union security state (termed “antibusiness” in the study).28 The author 
suggested that many local factors such as climate and access to transportation are similar on both 
                                                 
25 For representative example, see National Institute for Labor Relations Research, Right to Work States Benefit from 
Faster Growth, Higher Real Purchasing Power - 2011 Update, October 25, 2011, http://nilrr.org/2011/10/25/right-
work-states-benefit-faster-growth-higher-real-purchasing-power-2011-update/. 
26 For a representative critique, see Gordon Lafer and Sylvia Allegretto, Does Right to Work Create Jobs?: Answers 
from Oklahoma, Economic Policy Institute, March 16, 2011, http://www.epi.org/publication/bp300/. 
27 For a summary of incentives for businesses in North Dakota, see “Quick Facts,” from the North Dakota Department 
of Commerce, Division of Economic Development and Finance at http://www.business.nd.gov/uploads/resources/203/
2010quickfactsbrochureprint.pdf. 
28 Thomas Holmes, “The Effect of State Policies on the Location of Manufacturing: Evidence from State Borders,” 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 106, no. 4 (August 1998), pp. 667-705. 
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sides of the border and that varied outcomes on either side of the border would reflect the 
respective policies of the states. 
The study tracked growth in manufacturing employment between 1947 (the passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act) and 1992. It found that among counties within 25 miles of a state border, 
manufacturing employment in counties in RTW states grew about one-third faster than 
manufacturing employment in the nearby counties in non-RTW states. The author concluded that 
the abrupt changes in employment at the state borders were consistent with the hypothesis that 
state policies influence site location. 
In spite of these findings, the author expressed uncertainty as to the influence of RTW laws. 
Holmes emphasized that while he used RTW and union security as a proxy for states’ business-
friendliness, “the effect found here is an overall effect of state policy. The analysis does not 
identify the contribution to the overall effect of any one particular policy, for example, a right-to-
work law” (emphasis in original). Holmes further qualified the study’s findings regarding RTW 
by citing a ranking of states’ business climates. He noted that while RTW laws were only one of 
15 equally-weighted criteria considered in the ranking, 14 of the 15 highest-ranked states had an 
RTW law, suggesting a strong correlation between RTW laws and other pro-business policies. 
Holmes concluded that subsequent study is necessary to isolate the effect of RTW laws. CRS was 
unable to locate such a study, and given the frequency with which the Holmes study is still cited 
in RTW discussions, it appears that no such widely accepted study has emerged. 
Right to Work and Wages 
Table 5 presents average annual wage data from RTW and union security states in 2011 and 
shows that wages in union security states were 16.6% higher than in RTW states. As is the case 
with employment levels, there is little controversy over these aggregate numbers and the trend 
depicted in the table is relatively well-established. 
Table 5. Employment and Average Annual Wages in Right to Work and Union 
Security States, 2011 
 Employment 
Total Wages  
(in thousands) 
Average Annual 
Wage 
United States 129,411,099 6,217,285,908 $48,043 
RTW States 50,579,217 2,207,308,191 43,641 
Union Security States 78,831,882 4,009,977,717 50,867 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW). In this presentation, 
CRS has divided the data into RTW and union security states. 
Note: Due to varied data sources, employment levels may not be directly comparable to other tables. In 
accordance with its status in 2011, Indiana was classified as a union security state. 
Many studies have attempted to control for differences between the states and isolate the effect of 
RTW polices. A 1998 summary of the empirical literature concluded that “RTW laws have no 
impact on union wages, nonunion wages, or average wages in either the public or private 
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sector.”29 Subsequent studies have challenged this conclusion, with findings mixed between 
positive and negative wage effects from RTW laws.  
A 2011 study by Gould and Shierholz examined household survey data to compare wages 
between RTW and union security states while controlling for personal characteristics (such as the 
lower share of workers in RTW states with college degrees) as well as macro state characteristics 
(such as the higher cost of living in union security states).30 In total, the study controlled for 42 
demographic, economic, geographic, and policy factors. The study concluded that “[o]nce we 
control for our comprehensive set of both individual and state-level observable characteristics, we 
find that the mean effect of working in a right-to-work state is a 3.2% reduction in wages.” The 
same study reached similar conclusions regarding negative relationships between RTW and 
employed-provided benefits. 
Another study with a very different methodology challenges this conclusion. A 2003 study by 
Reed examined state-level income data and, unlike many other studies, controlled for the states’ 
varied economic conditions before the adoption of RTW.31 Among other variables, Reed 
controlled for each state’s per capita income in 1945, prior to the initial wave of RTW laws 
following the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. The author reasoned that since RTW states were 
typically among the lower-income states at the time of enacting RTW, comparisons between RTW 
and union security states should control for this initial condition. The study concluded that, after 
controlling for income levels in 1945, RTW laws were related to wages 6.7% higher than in union 
security states. The study also concluded that this effect was strongest in states with the lowest 
levels of income in 1945 and that states with higher initial incomes experienced weaker or 
perhaps even negative effects from RTW laws. 
Right to Work and Other Outcomes 
Additional RTW-related research on other topics further illustrates the difficulty of 
comprehensively evaluating the effects of RTW policies. For example, Zullo examined fatal on-
the-job injuries of construction workers in the context of RTW laws and union density. The study 
concluded that higher unionization rates in the local construction industry were related to lower 
fatality rates and that unionization’s relationship with reducing fatalities was strongest in union 
security states.32 
Conversely, studies that considered other outcomes suggested benefits to RTW laws. A 2009 
study by Stevans found that RTW had little effect on employment but did have a positive 
relationship with proprietors’ incomes.33 A 2000 study looked at the performance of stocks for 
companies based in Louisiana and Idaho during the periods when those states were initially 
                                                 
29 William J. Moore, “The Determinants and Effects of Right-to-Work Laws: A Review of the Recent Literature,” 
Journal of Labor Economics, Summer 1998, p. 460. 
30 See Heidi Shierholz and Elise Gould, The Compensation Penalty of “Right-to-Work” Laws, Economic Policy 
Institute, Issue Brief #299, February 17, 2011, http://www.epi.org/publication/bp299/. 
31 Robert W. Reed, “How Right to Work Laws Affect Wages,” Journal of Labor Research, Fall 2003. 
32 Roland Zullo, Right-to-Wok Laws and Fatalities in Construction, University of Michigan Institute for Research of 
Labor, Employment, and the Economy, March 2011, http://irlee.umich.edu/Publications/Docs/
RightToWorkLawsAndFatalitiesInConstruction.pdf. 
33 Lonnie K. Stevans, “The Effect of Endogenous Right-to-Work Laws on Business and Economic Conditions in the 
United States: A Multivariate Approach,” Review of Law and Economics, 2009, pp. 595-614. 
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passing their RTW laws in 1976 and 1986, respectively. This study evaluated the performance of 
these stocks on days where there was key movement in RTW legislation in the respective states 
and found that, relative to the larger market, stocks from companies based in these states 
increased 2% to 4%.34 
Considerations for a National Right to Work Law 
The primary issue in the ongoing RTW debate pertains to the rights and expectations of workers 
who are covered by a collective bargaining agreement but do not wish to pay union dues. 
Supporters of expanding RTW laws argue that these workers should have a right to choose 
whether or not to support their representing labor organization. Advocates of union security 
agreements emphasize that negotiating labor organizations are required to represent all workers in 
the bargaining unit, so it is a reasonable expectation to require all workers in the bargaining unit 
to financially support the labor organization. 
Advocates and opponents of expanding RTW laws also posit higher-order effects to support their 
respective views. Supporters of RTW laws suggest that such laws increase employer flexibility, 
and may make it difficult for strong unions to be sustained, which in turn may lead to increases in 
efficiency and economic output. Opponents of RTW laws suggest that such laws reduce the 
financial viability of unions, leading to declines in collective bargaining and corresponding 
benefits for workers. 
In assessing the potential effects of expanding RTW, existing empirical research is inconclusive. 
Comparing outcomes in states with and without RTW laws can provide limited perspectives on 
possible effects of these laws, but states’ economies are extremely complex and even the most 
sophisticated studies are unable to fully isolate the effects of varied union security policies. 
Furthermore, the variation in findings among researchers suggests that no consensus will be 
reached in the near future. As such, the ongoing debate on RTW may be driven by factors other 
than rigorous empirical evidence. 
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